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A nalysis in bioethics has relied primarily on the iden-tification and application of general principles andon the examination of particular paradigmatic
cases.' Principalism and casuistry depend on an assump-
tion of generalizability; that is, that learning and insights
gained from an understanding of the principles or the case
may be effectively applied to other similar situations. For
the most part, the particular characteristics of the institu-
tional setting have not played a central role in these ap-
proaches.^ It would appear, then, that what has been learned
in the context of one health care setting is transferable,
with some few adjustments, to another.
The institutional context does make both a practical
and a substantive difference, however, and shifting ethical
analyses from one context to another has sometimes proven
difficult. This has been so, for example, in the context of
nursing home care.^
Bioethics and managed care
Acute care bioethics has encountered many problems in
translation to managed care systems as well. Ethicists have
persistently struggled with developing an appropriate ethic
for physicians practicing within managed care systems and
for managed care itself. The difficulties emerge from many
directions. Managed care raises issues of allocation and
limitations, for example, which have not been treated as
core issues for individual treatment decisions in the past.
In fact, issues of ability to pay, rationing, coverage, and
reimbursement were generally viewed as irrelevant as a
matter of principle to the central task of analyzing what
ought to be done in a particular treatment decision.''
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 23 (1995): 266-72.
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Some of the mismatch between hospital-based bioeth-
ics and bioethics as applied in other health care contexts
arises from limitations in the general principles. For ex-
ample, analysis of an ethical issue under the autonomy prin-
ciple commonly assumes as its starting point a competent
individual living relatively independently and then extrapo-
lates from that assumption to other circumstances. That
concept has to be adjusted seriously rather than simply at
the margins, if it is to be applied to nursing home residents
or home health patients who are severely dependent on
daily intimate health care assistance from professionals,
aides, and family.^
The scope and meaning of the autonomy principle is
also fundamentally at issue in coverage decisions in man-
aged care and other health insurance plans. To the extent
that managed care is viewed as limiting consumption of at
least marginally beneficial health care services, some have
claimed that the autonomy principle exercised in the
consumer's choice of health plans justifies treatment limi-
tations exercised by those plans.*
Bioethics and the organizational context:
managed care as a regulatory environment
Dissonance may also arise from radical differences in the
nature and structure of the health care organization. An
institutional factor, which may have an impact on ethical
decision making and behavior, is whether the dominant
decision makers are those engaged solely in patient care or
in administrative or management functions. This is not to
say that administrators are ethically inferior to caregiving
professionals; rather, the administrator—including the
physician- or nurse-administrator—clearly has dual roles,
including fiduciary duties to the organization and obliga-
tions for the well being of patients. The health care admini-
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strator's duty to the institution, the administrator's job
description, and the administrator's legal obligations in-
clude responsibility for the financial health and growth, of
the institution.^ In the best of worlds, these duties to the
institution are quite compatible with a fiduciary duty to
the patient; but, in many situations, they conflict or at least
require modification and prioritization.* Both in nursing
homes and managed care, management and administra-
tion have a very significant role in treatment decisions and
thus in ethical issues. The dual roles of the administrator
carry an ethical dimension of their own.
Finally, managed care brings its own "institutional"
framework to the decision-making process. Managed care
is a catch-all phrase for a broad variety of activities and
organizations. Core to its definition and key to its distinc-
tion from indemnity health plans is that managed care is
structured to integrate the insurance risk and the direct
provision of care. Managed care uses a very large and de-
veloping repertoire of tools to influence individual treat-
ment decisions aggregated over a population, including
distributing information to providers on relative effective-
ness and cost of treatment; providing financial incentives
and disincentives based on risk sharing in the cost of treat-
ment decisions; pre-treatment certification; post-treatment
review; practice profiles; practice guidelines; and so forth.
Managed care, like nursing home care, is often char-
acterized by the direct care providers as a highly regulated
environment for health care decision making. The regula-
tory and bureaucratic context in managed care is not pub-
lic, governmental regulation; rather, it is a private regula-
tory, bureaucratic environment. There are very important
differences between public regulation and private "regula-
tion." For example, value choices incorporated within the
standards of a governmental regulatory system may repre-
sent a level of societal consensus or political compromise.
Functionally, too, significant differences can arise in terms
of the location of control in the system, the legal rights of
patients and providers, and the procedures for establishing
or changing rules.
As a practical matter, however, individual health care
professionals often do not distinguish among government
regulation, private accreditation standards, risk manage-
ment policies, payment/reimbursement decisions, or inter-
nal corporate rules and policies when they speak of "regu-
lation" that restricts their practice.' From a treating physi-
cian's perspective, managed care is often viewed as exert-
ing external control over individual treatment decisions.'"
The influence is seen as external to the physician-patient
dyad, which has been the focus of bioethics and medical
ethics during the past generation; and it is seen as control-
ling even when both the typical managed care contract
provides and the legal principle holds that the doctor can-
not disclaim responsibility for treatment decisions.
Even though contract terms stating that the physician
remains responsible for individual treatment decisions are
common, managed care does not defer to physician au-
thority to the degree that the traditional physician-patient-
indemnity insurer relationship does. In fact, what man-
aged care brings to health care is the goal and ability to
intervene in physician-patient decision making through
various tools. Intervention may be procedural (requiring
the physician to seek approval but always granting ap-
proval), nondirective (offering advisory guidelines or ag-
gregate financial incentives), or informational (providing
the physician and insurer with individual practice profiles).
But whether the tool is merely procedural, completely
nondirective, or simply informational, the formal and in-
formal penalties to providers for violating or testing the
boundaries of the "rules" implicit in these tools are tan-
gible in terms of financial or other material costs of time,
administrative resources, and human energy.
Finally, in managed care, as in nursing home care, the
influence or control that is pilloried as an obstacle to good
care responds to known quality problems in the system.
For nursing homes, the restrictive environment responds
to the history of negligent care and the particular vulner-
ability and isolation of the resident population." For man-
aged care, the restrictive environment responds to incen-
tives to overtreatment in the traditional fee-for-service (FFS),
physician-driven indemnity structure.'^ Managed care also
reacts to the former insurance-provider alliance in which
provider and insurer interests sometimes combined to pro-
vide excessive and nonproductive treatment in a price-in-
sensitive system." So the regulations for each of these re-
strictive environments capture some notion of the good,
even as they create challenges to ethical decision making.
A core question for managed care is what specific level
of medical treatment should doctors provide to individual
patients and should patients expect under this framework.
The discussion that follows aims to mark a path to that
question by clearing out some of the underbrush that pro-
viders, patients, and managed care organization (MCOs)
encounter—or create—before that definitive issue can be
or should be confronted.
"They made me do it"
Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that doctors per-
ceive managed care regulations as preventing them from
behaving in an ethical manner, or at least from doing what
they believe is best for their patients in certain circum-
stances. The current controversy over the appropriate length
of stay for childbirth provides an example.
Several states have recently passed or considered legis-
lation mandating coverage of minimum postpartum hos-
pital stays in response to the guidelines accepted by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) and the American Academy of Pediatrics
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The legislation and ACOG and AAP guidelines respond
both to data indicating an overall reduction in length of
stay after delivery and to complaints concerning payer re-
strictions on coverage of postpartum hospitalization. One
obstetrician said that she was visited by a representative of
an insurer who presented her practice profile in chart form.
The insurer said she would remain in the system because
of her low rate of Caesarian sections, but she needed to get
her patients out of the hospital faster. This doctor stated
that she viewed that conversation as a message to discharge
her patients more quickly or to face termination from the
plan.'"" The chief executive officer of the Minnesota Medi-
cal Association stated that while insurance companies say
it is the doctor's decision, the doctors "have to jump through
a lot of hoops to [keep their patients hospitalized beyond
the minimum]."'^ Another physician reported that her pa-
tients were billed for part or all of the hospital's charges
for hospital stays that exceeded the twenty-four-hour
"guidelines."'*
On the other hand, many insurers report that they do
not maintain short-stay requirements: one insurer stated
that the twenty-four-hour standard "was never meant as a
strict twenty-four-hour policy, but... the provider commu-
nity has interpreted it as rigid." Because of that interpreta-
tion, the insurer was considering altering its policy.'^ Analy-
sis of the empirical research concerning the benefit or harm
of longer or shorter hospitalization is required to evaluate
fully the merits of the dispute. But what is interesting for
purposes of this article is the interaction between individual
physicians and MCOs concerning postpartum hospitaliza-
tion rules.
Whose rules?
The complaint, that the regulations at times restrict good
care, may be pointing the finger at the wrong target. The
managed care insurer or reviewer may be blamed, for ex-
ample, when the culprit is the rules and policies established
by another entity, such as a hospital responding to a man-
aged care environment.
Clearly identifying the source of the prohibition or
constraint is critical for effective analysis of the problem.
The question of whether the MCO and the insured have
contracted for a particular service or intervention, for ex-
ample, should be treated differently than the question of
whether the hospital's efforts to be generally fiscally at-
tractive to the payer market should influence the level and
style of treatment available to that patient. Managed care
plans are not uniform; some cover specific services and
treatments that others do not, and some establish a pattern
of denials or approvals that differs from others in like cases.
Some patients have actually paid for coverage that is less
restrictive than what other consumers have chosen. More-
over, while managed care may dominate some regional
markets, that domination is not complete, and some pa-
tients have purchased FFS physician-driven coverage. In-
stitutional or facility policies that adopt the lowest com-
mon denominator among managed care methodologies for
all patients could operate to deprive some consumers of
the health care benefits or the health care decision-making
process for which they have paid.
Even if the physician or other provider has accurately
named the source of the rule or policy that is controlling,
other self-interested behaviors may be occurring. These
behaviors on the part of the provider and the managed
care plan have ethical implications, which are analyzed in
the sections that follow.
Scapegoating the regulations
A threshold question is whether the charge that the man-
aged care plan prohibits good care is asserted honestly In
some cases, the insurance rule may be used as a scapegoat
for the provider's own interests. Physician's medical treat-
ment decisions are induced by a number of external fac-
tors unrelated to managed care.'* The provider might be
protecting his or her own financial interests or might be
trying to avoid administrative conflict. A physician may
find it easier to tell a patient that the insurance company
will not "allow" another day in the hospital or an intrave-
nous rather than intramuscular injection of pain medica-
tion than to explain that the hospital is monitoring physi-
cian practice patterns for resource utilization or that the
physician's practice group benefits financially if the pa-
tient is discharged sooner or if a less costly but less effec-
tive form of pain management is used.
Blaming the insurer's regulations is a particularly pow-
erful source of control because it diverts attention from the
real decision maker and from the true reason for the de-
nial. It does so in a fashion that creates an assumption of
powerlessness, because the decision appears to be outside
the control of the patient or the doctor.
The ethical duty here is quite clear. If the provider
gives a reason for the particular decision, he or she has an
unequivocal duty to be truthful in presenting those rea-
sons. While some have argued over what the physician
must disclose to the patient concerning financial interests,
no substantial conflict has arisen over whether the pro-
vider must be truthful in the information actually given to
the patient. Scapegoating managed care is unethical as a
violation of this very limited duty of truthtelling.
Similarly, because the duty of truthtelling is so clearly
established, the obverse is also true. Disguising a denial of
treatment by the insurer in the clothes of a recommenda-
tion based on the physician's professional judgment and
ordinary practice also violates this basic principle. Con-
tract provisions that prohibit providers from revealing the
plan's denial of approval as the source for the refusal to go
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forward with a particular treatment are inconsistent with
the fiduciary duty of honesty to the patient."
Managed care has financial incentives for erecting bar-
riers between insureds and the coverage determination pro-
cess. But, if the patient does not know that a choice is to be
made and does not know who controls or participates in
that choice, that patient is less able to complain and pursue
claims for treatment against the insurer. If the doctor learns
the rules, he or she may be able to "game" them in order to
increase the approval rate on his or her claims for pre-
treatment certification. Providing accurate information can
produce financial benefits in terms of risk management,
however. Accurate and accessible information allows for
correcting misunderstandings and for avoiding breach of
standards of care prior to inflicting injury.
Beyond the financial costs and benefits of providing
accurate and detailed coverage information, any contrac-
tual approach to treatment limitations requires that un-
conscionable inequities in information concerning the terms
of that contract be corrected. The MCO must provide ac-
cess to accurate and detailed information about coverage
if patients are to have any chance of effectively asserting
their own interests.
I heard it through the grapevine
The written rule or regulation simply may not support the
provider's claim that the insurer will not pay for the de-
sired intervention. Yet, the provider's understanding of the
insurer's rule is honestly asserted. It is possible that the
provider is dealing with rules that are different from those
written in the benefits documents or in the external com-
munications of the insurer.
Individuals dealing with an extensive body of rules
that govern their actions on a daily basis may rely substan-
tially on informal or word-of-mouth sources for the con-
tent of the rules. At some point, the time and expense in-
volved in checking written standards, making the telephone
call to ask specific questions, or asking for pre-treatment
certification motivate the provider to seek other sources of
information. It is likely that anecdotal information will be
available from colleagues or clerical staff as to their past
experiences in seeking approvals on behalf of patients. It is
simpler to generalize from and to rely on the provider's
own or colleagues' past experience. The individual case,
however, may be different in a way that would be signifi-
cant to the payer's decision; or the plan's informal poli-
cies, guidelines, or screens for review may have changed;
or the previous encounter may have been for a similar treat-
ment but under a different insurance plan.
Any rule-bound system that does not distribute its
written rules in an accessible form promotes excessive reli-
ance on informal and perhaps unreliable sources. A system
whose rules are inaccessible to those governed by them.
such as informal guidelines, training manuals, and strictly
internal memoranda, for the application of rules to par-
ticular situations will experience a similar behavior. When
the rule is unclear, it will have an impact quite different
from that intended, to the disadvantage of the patient, the
doctor, and, possibly, the insurer.
Another significant component in this problem is the
role of the individual case reviewer. Discretion is an inevi-
table part of any system that requires the application of
standards to particular circumstances, as do the retrospec-
tive and pre-treatment approval mechanisms of managed
care. An ethical system of regulation, however, does not
foster uneven application of the rules either intentionally
or through neglect. Inconsistency in implementation can
occur in several instances.
Systems that rely on case-by-case review should ac-
tively monitor the outcomes of this individualized review
to assure that irrelevant factors (such as the identity of the
doctor, legal representation, race, or gender) do not influ-
ence the result.^" Responses to treatment inquiries that ap-
pear frequently and in recognizable patterns may need
greater standardization in order to avoid rationing through
procedural obstacles. Furthermore, any system that relies
on a pattern of denials at the first level and approvals only
after objections are raised or appeals are pursued (and only
to the class of individuals who do so) is inequitable and
dishonest.
Providers cannot be held to ignore completely the in-
formation available on the grapevine. To the extent pos-
sible, however, the provider should be held to check the
accuracy of such information. The duty of inquiry described
here does not necessarily include a duty to contest the ac-
tual standards of the MCO, once they are accurately deter-
mined.^' This duty calls the provider merely to ascertain
what the standard of the individual patient's plan is. A
duty to advocate on behalf of the patient has generated
some controversy, to the extent that it can be viewed as
requiring the physician to work against legitimate cost-
effectiveness standards." A duty of inquiry, in contrast, is
necessary in order for the cost-access trade-off to function
effectively in the first place.
The MCO should create a "safe place" for inquiries.
Contract provisions with substantial penalties for exces-
sive denials of requests for approval are incompatible with
this duty of inquiry on the part of individual physicians.
Contract penalties for excessive denials create incentives
for providers to work well within the plans' own estab-
lished boundaries, creating a margin of safety for them-
selves, with the result that patients do not receive medical
services for which they have contracted. Medical treatment
is rationed according to the timidity of the physician fac-
ing "decapitation" or lesser penalty. This is not to say, how-
ever, that current legislative efforts to respond to such con-
tracts are workable."
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All's not well that ends well
Formal and informal penalties exist in any bureaucratic
system. The regulatory context for the very high incidence
of physically restrained patients in nursing homes, which
existed until the early 1990s, is one illustration.^"* No gov-
ernment regulation required that facilities physically re-
strain large percentages of ambulatory patients to prevent
them from falling. But falls and unsupervised departures
from the facility required, at a minimum, internal incident
reports and usually triggered government investigation.
Physically restraining a resident to a bed or chair did not
trigger either of these administrative hassles. The cost of a
fall thus included the financial and other costs of scrutiny,
including completing paperwork, participating in the in-
vestigation, responding to the charges, and contesting any
penalty. Even though the facility's care might ultimately
be accepted as meeting the regulatory requirement or stan-
dard of care, the process itself exacted a price for that re-
sult. Tying a patient to a bed or chair did not require that
an incident report be filed nor would it cause any serious
inquiry from the government agency. Simply doing the bad
thing—restraining the resident—became the course that
was not penalized by the system. Such a state of affairs
communicated an unmistakable message: What did the
government regulations require? They required restraints.
It hardly mattered that no government regulation could be
found to support that commonly held belief.
The ideal for health care professionals is to make the
"right" care decision despite the costs. But the regulatory
system—including administrative systems established by
MCOs—in the interest of fairness and effectiveness must
also respond. The first step in a regulatory response to the
sub rosa penalties of the process is to inventory those pen-
alties.
Contract penalties for specific behaviors or practice
patterns may ultimately never be enforced by the plan
against the particular provider. Peculiar circumstances or
an unusual population mix, for example, may be found on
further review to justify the number of submissions for
payment or the practice patterns of a particular physician.
But the stakes of the penalty and the cost of responding to
review of the particular circumstances will necessarily en-
courage providers to steer clear of the disputed boundary
questions, denying treatment that is covered and that the
MCO has a duty to provide.
Patterns of first-level denials followed by approvals on
more persistent inquiries" or substantial procedural require-
ments for approvals that are routinely granted create simi-
lar problems. A pattern of initial denial and subsequent
approval will discourage medical loss (HMO jargon for
the amount actually paid for medical services) and can be
strategically used to control medical costs. However, such
administrative behavior leads to significant quality and eq-
uity problems with serious implications for contract and
consent theories for allocations made through managed
care.
In an inventory of the sub rosa penalties of the pro-
cess, financial compensation systems cannot be dissociated
from their impact on individual treatment decisions. Al-
though incentive systems generally apply only to the ag-
gregate rather than to individual cases, claims, by the MCO
that establishes the system, that it bears no responsibility
for their influence in particular cases can only be seen as
disingenuous. Although the individual doctor cannot and
should not be able to claim the incentive system as a de-
fense for substandard care, the MCO cannot completely
dissociate itself from the ethical ramifications of the sys-
tems from which it benefits.
The rules are wrong
While the previous four categories of claims that managed
care systems limit good care apply to the way the rules are
used strategically by health care providers or by MCOs,
this category addresses the standards of care themselves. It
does happen that the physician and the patient are right
and the plan wrong about whether or not a standard is
appropriate and beneficial. Emerging technologies, tech-
niques, and Pharmaceuticals require constant reassessment,
and the plan's assessment of effectiveness can be out-of-
date or empirically insupportable. But beyond such advances,
allocation or cost-effectiveness assessments rest on value
judgments that also require reevaluation. The value judg-
ments are most difficult, because they may require striking
a balance among competing goods.
The transition from a standard that accepted the use
of restraints in nursing homes to a standard that generally
views physical restraints as inappropriate and substandard
illustrates the combination of ongoing empirical research
and values clarification that must occur in standard set-
ting. In the case of physical restraints, the frequent use of
restraints reflected a balance of values between autonomy/
freedom and beneficence to vulnerable individuals that fa-
vored protection. This weighting was later rejected when
claims for increased risk taking, mobility, and autonomy in
nursing homes became stronger. The transition in the use
of restraints was, in part, a transition in values. Further-
more, when empirical research on the effectiveness of re-
straints was finally completed, it indicated that the per-
ceived trade-offs between the risks of injuries suffered in
falls and the effectiveness of restraints in preventing these
injuries had been false. In fact, restraints caused serious
iatrogenic injuries and did not necessarily prevent falls.^'
Cost is a primary concern in nursing home care, and strong
assertions that restraints were the only cost-effective means
of reducing injury were undermined only when a number
of facilities began to report that untying the elderly pa-
tients did not cost more and, in fact, might cost
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Situations analogous to that of restraints arise in man-
aged care. Policies established by MCOs for coverage of
effective pain relief illustrate how standard setting responds
both to scientific and medical advances and to evolving
ethical norms.^'
The administrative response to the problem of "bad"
rules might occur on two levels. The first is to accept that
the regulations do not always capture, once and for all, the
measure of quality care. Sponsored research can contrib-
ute an empirical foundation essential for establishing and
applying standards to treatment decisions in managed care.
Just as important, setting the standards also requires
unpacking decisions to identify the ethical issues embed-
ded in what appear to be wholly scientific or financial ques-
tions relating to medical treatment. This is at the core of
both quality control regulation and bioethics. Decisions
regarding life-sustaining treatment or human experimen-
tation, for example, were transformed from an entirely
medical issue to one of choice by isolating the medical
issues from the values implicated in those decisions. The
range of individuals entitled to participate in the process of
evaluating treatment and experimentation expanded once
it was recognized that the choice implicated values.^' In
these traditional bioethics decisions, it has been recognized,
though not without controversy, that decision making must
incorporate other disciplines and other viewpoints. Wid-
ening the table to include physician-contractors in the dis-
cussion of coverage and treatment standards in managed
care does not reach wide enough.^"
A distinguishing feature of government standard set-
ting for nursing home regulation has been that cost has
always been treated as relevant. The ideal has succumbed
to the next best or to minimum standards in the reality of
resource limitations. In the context of public regulation,
one would recommend a commission or a task force or a
negotiated rulemaking process to deal with these types of
issues. It is time to look for similar instruments that can be
incorporated within MCOs.
Conclusion
Intensive regulatiori, both real and perceived or govern-
mental and corporate, contributes to the exaggerated sense
of regulatory determinism experienced in nursing homes.
The private regulatory and bureaucratic system through
which managed care plans influence medical treatment
decisions could produce a similar dynamic. But interpret-
ing every claim that the regulations require bad care as an
accurate charge against the government regulation and sur-
veillance of nursing homes is misplaced.
Similarly, claims that MCOs require bad care have to
be examined under ethical norms. In some cases, managed
care is scapegoated. In more than a few cases, the regula-
tion in question is the internal procedure of the health care
facility itself, which has been adopted in the facility's own
interest. In others, the claim that the regulations prohibit
good and compassionate care is based on honest misun-
derstanding. Sometimes, the failure to provide adequate
care is attributable to incentives and disincentives built into
the administration of the system rather than to the rules
prohibiting particular treatment interventions. Health care
providers and managed care plans can respond to these situa-
tions more effectively. And, in some cases, the standards
are wrong, either as a matter of empirical evidence or as a
matter of the value choices inherent in the standards.
The focus in the literature on the ethical challenges
confronting physicians and other health care professionals
in managed care is well placed. But, for the regulator, set-
ting the standards for treatment coverage and the design-
ing procedural mechanisms for implementing standards of
coverage are not value-neutral activities. If these standards
are correctly identified as value-based, the process for es-
tablishing such standards must broaden.
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